Home > Perspectives > Governance > Why Governance Reviews Should Happen Before a Crisis, Not After

Why Governance Reviews Should Happen Before a Crisis, Not After

Watch the short film

Play Video
A governance review is usually triggered by an incident that was avoidable. Why governance reviews belong before a crisis, not after.

What growth-phase research suggests

Larry E. Greiner’s research on organisational growth frames crisis as functionally built into the growth process itself — each phase of growth ends in a crisis precisely because the practices that worked at the previous scale are relied upon past the point where they remain adequate. This has an uncomfortable implication for proactive review: if crisis is the mechanism by which organisations typically discover that a governance structure has outgrown its usefulness, then organisations may have limited practical experience of discovering the same thing proactively, because the growth process itself has historically taught them to expect the crisis to be the signal.

What incentive research suggests

Steven Kerr’s research on organisations rewarding one behaviour while hoping for another offers a second angle. Proactive governance review — time spent examining a structure that is not currently visibly failing — rarely has a clear, immediate reward attached to it, compared with work that addresses a visible, pressing problem. If organisational attention reliably follows what is measured and rewarded, as Kerr’s research suggests, then proactive review is structurally disadvantaged relative to reactive response, because reactive response to an actual crisis is far more visibly rewarded — recognised, resourced, prioritised — than the comparatively invisible work of confirming that a structure not yet in crisis remains sound. Kerr’s own documented examples of this divergence — interviewers rewarded for speed rather than placement quality, investigators rewarded for case volume rather than case difficulty — describe organisations that got exactly what they measured, at the expense of what they actually wanted. Governance review timing follows the same logic: an organisation that measures and rewards visible crisis response, without any comparable recognition for time spent on review that finds nothing wrong, should expect proactive review to lose out in the competition for leadership attention, regardless of how much anyone genuinely values it in principle.

What psychological-safety research suggests

Amy Edmondson’s research on psychological safety adds a third angle specific to how a proactive review would actually have to begin: someone would need to raise the possibility that a currently functioning governance structure has a latent flaw, before any evidence of failure exists to justify the concern. Edmondson’s finding that psychological safety, rather than general team confidence, predicts whether teams surface this kind of tentative, unproven concern suggests that proactive review is disproportionately unlikely in lower-safety environments — precisely because it requires someone to raise a concern that cannot yet point to a concrete failure as evidence. This is a meaningfully harder kind of statement to make than flagging an incident that has already occurred, because it invites a colleague to question, in advance and without proof, a structure that has been working well enough that nobody else has raised any concern about it.

Where these threads agree

All three threads converge on the same underlying conclusion: proactive governance review is disadvantaged not by any single cause but by several reinforcing ones. Growth-phase research suggests organisations are conditioned to expect crisis as the discovery mechanism. Incentive research suggests proactive review is structurally under-rewarded relative to reactive response. Psychological-safety research suggests even raising the possibility of a latent flaw requires a degree of interpersonal risk that many teams are reluctant to take. None of the three, on its own, fully explains the pattern — together, they describe a structure in which reactive governance review is close to the default outcome.

Where they diverge

The three threads suggest different points of leverage for changing the pattern. Greiner’s research points toward building an expectation of periodic review into how growth itself is managed, rather than treating review as separate from growth. Kerr’s research points toward the reward structure — proactive review would need some form of recognition or resourcing to compete with the visibility of reactive crisis response. Edmondson’s research points toward the interpersonal environment — a team with genuinely high psychological safety may conduct proactive review simply because raising a tentative concern carries less personal risk there, independent of any change to incentives or expectations.

What remains unresolved

None of these three bodies of research was designed to test governance review timing directly, and the connections drawn here are reasonable extensions rather than direct findings. What the evidence supports, taken together, is that the tendency toward reactive rather than proactive governance review is a genuinely multi-causal pattern, which likely means no single intervention — better incentives alone, or more safety alone — is sufficient on its own to shift it.

It is also worth being honest about what this convergence does not establish: it does not tell an organisation how much proactive review is enough, nor does it offer a way to distinguish, in advance, between a structure that genuinely needs review and one that does not — the same three reinforcing barriers apply regardless of whether the underlying concern turns out to be justified. An organisation that succeeds in overcoming all three barriers still faces the ordinary difficulty of judging which parts of its governance structure most warrant scrutiny, a question this body of research does not directly answer.

The same pattern appears across many kinds of organisation; see Other Sectors for how it is read elsewhere.

Questions worth considering

  1. What would prompt a review of governance in this organisation if no incident had occurred — and when was one last held for that reason alone?
  2. Is time spent examining a structure that is working well enough recognised in any way, or does attention go to whatever is visibly pressing?
  3. Who could raise a concern about a working structure, before any evidence of failure, without it being heard as an accusation?

More on this topic: Governance.

Your team is facing similar challenges?

Written After the Last Crisis — governance review
The Riddle Ledger, a brand of Zoom Riddle

Subscribe to The Riddle Ledger

Perspectives are sent as they are published, with no promotional email, and you can unsubscribe at any time.

Sources

Amy C. Edmondson, “Psychological Safety and Learning Behavior in Work Teams,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(2), 1999, pp. 350–383.

Larry E. Greiner, “Evolution and Revolution as Organizations Grow,” Harvard Business Review, Vol. 50, No. 4 (July–August 1972), pp. 37–46; republished as an HBR Classic, Vol. 76, No. 3 (May–June 1998).

Steven Kerr, “On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B,” Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 18, No. 4 (December 1975), pp. 769–783.

You need a PDF version for a meeting?

Frequently Asked Questions

Several reinforcing factors appear to contribute: growth research suggests crisis is the discovery mechanism organisations are most accustomed to, incentive research suggests proactive review is under-rewarded relative to visible crisis response, and psychological-safety research suggests raising an unproven concern carries real interpersonal risk.
The research drawn on here was not designed to test review timing directly — the connections are reasonable extensions of related findings rather than a direct study of proactive review itself.
Based on the threads discussed, plausible factors include building review expectations into how growth itself is managed, ensuring proactive work receives some form of recognition, and fostering an environment where raising an unproven concern feels safe.
Not necessarily — some governance gaps are genuinely difficult to anticipate before they manifest. The concern is less that reactive review happens at all, and more that it appears to be the default and near-exclusive pattern in most organisations.
Greiner treats crisis as built into growth, with each phase ending in a crisis because earlier practices are relied upon past the point where they remain adequate. The page draws the implication that if crisis is how organisations usually discover a structure has been outgrown, they may have little practical experience of discovering it proactively.
Drawing on Steven Kerr’s research, the page suggests attention tends to follow what is measured and rewarded. Responding to a visible crisis is recognised, resourced and prioritised, while confirming that a structure not yet in crisis remains sound is comparatively invisible. Review that finds nothing wrong therefore earns little recognition, whatever its value in principle.
The page, drawing on Amy Edmondson’s findings, notes that a proactive review requires someone to suggest a working structure may have a latent flaw, without a concrete failure as evidence. This invites colleagues to question, in advance and without proof, something that has been working well enough, which is more likely to be voiced in teams with higher psychological safety.
No. The page states that none of the three bodies of research was designed to test review timing directly, so the connections drawn are reasonable extensions rather than direct findings. The evidence also does not say how much review is enough, or how to tell in advance which structures genuinely warrant scrutiny.