Home > Sectors > Multi-Site Franchise > Why Communication Breaks Down Across Franchise Networks

Why Communication Breaks Down Across Franchise Networks

Watch the short film

Play Video
Franchise network communication stalls at the boundary: information that should travel between franchisor and franchisee often stops there.

What the research found

Donald Sull, Rebecca Homkes and Charles Sull’s multi-year study of more than 250 companies and several thousand managers, published in Harvard Business Review, found that only 9% of managers said they could rely on colleagues in other functions and units all of the time to deliver what was expected of them; roughly half said they could rely on them most of the time. The researchers’ broader conclusion is worth stating precisely: in the organisations they studied, alignment on strategic direction was generally sound. The breakdown consistently happened elsewhere, in the coordination between units that needed to act on that shared direction together.

Amy Edmondson’s Harvard Business School research on psychological safety, published in Administrative Science Quarterly following a field study of 51 manufacturing work teams, found that team psychological safety predicted learning behaviour — the willingness to surface problems, ask questions and report mistakes — even after controlling for team efficacy, meaning a highly capable team without safety still underperformed a less capable one that had it. Applied to communication across a franchise network, this suggests that whether information travels has less to do with how capable or well-intentioned the people involved are, and more to do with whether the environment makes surfacing a problem feel safe or costly.

Why the franchisor-franchisee boundary is structurally harder to cross

Internal cross-unit communication, the kind Sull, Homkes and Sull studied, already faces real obstacles — different priorities, different reporting lines, simple distance. A franchise network adds a further, more specific obstacle on top of those: the boundary between franchisor and franchisee is not just organisational, it is contractual and economic. A franchisee reporting a problem to the franchisor is not simply informing a colleague; depending on the nature of the problem, they may be disclosing something that could affect how their own performance is judged, how closely their site is scrutinised, or even their standing under the franchise agreement.

Michael Beer and Russell Eisenstat’s research on the barriers to strategy implementation, published in Sloan Management Review, identifies poor vertical communication as one of several mutually reinforcing obstacles that block organisations from acting on what they collectively know — obstacles that, they note, are often invisible to the leadership team sitting above them, precisely because the information that would reveal the problem is the information failing to travel. In a franchise network, this dynamic is sharpened by the fact that franchisees, unlike employees, have an independent economic interest in how they are perceived by the franchisor, which changes the calculation around raising a difficult issue: the honest report and the safe report are not always the same one.

This connects directly to Edmondson’s finding on psychological safety. If asking for help or flagging a problem has, in a given network’s actual history, led to increased scrutiny, audit, or strained relations rather than support, franchisees will rationally adjust their reporting behaviour to reflect that — not because the formal communication channel is inadequate, but because the channel accurately reflects what happens to information once it arrives.

What this looks like as it develops

The pattern rarely announces itself as a communication failure. It tends to first appear as head office being surprised by a problem that, in hindsight, had been developing for some time at site level — a decline in a specific area, a local competitive pressure, an operational issue that a franchisee had noticed well before it reached the point of visibility centrally. The retrospective question is usually “why didn’t we know sooner,” and the answer is rarely that nobody knew. Someone at the site level typically did know. The question that matters more is why that knowledge did not travel.

A common misconception is that adding more communication touchpoints — more frequent calls, more reporting requirements, more scheduled check-ins — closes this gap. It often does not, because more frequent contact through a channel franchisees do not fully trust simply produces more frequent opportunities to give the safe answer rather than the honest one. What changes the underlying dynamic is not the volume of communication but what has historically happened to the people who used it to raise something difficult.

This also explains why the breakdown is often asymmetric in a specific, recognisable direction. Positive information — a site performing well, a local success worth sharing — tends to travel upward without much friction, because there is little downside to reporting it. Information that reflects poorly on the site, or that might invite scrutiny, travels far less reliably, for exactly the reasons Beer and Eisenstat’s research describes. A network relying primarily on top-line reporting to gauge network health is, by the nature of that asymmetry, more likely to hear about what is going well than what is not — which is precisely the information that matters most to catch early.

There is a related failure mode worth naming separately: information that does travel, but arrives filtered by whoever passed it along. A regional manager relaying a franchisee’s concern to head office is not a neutral conduit — they have their own incentives around how their region is perceived, and a concern that reflects on their own oversight may be softened, reframed, or simply delayed before it reaches the people who could act on it. This means a network can have a formally functioning reporting chain, with every link individually doing something reasonable, and still lose the substance of a message somewhere along a chain with several such links in it. The 9% figure from Sull, Homkes and Sull’s research describes reliance between peers in a single organisation; a franchise network’s reporting chain typically has more links than that, each one a further point where the same dynamic can recur.

Where this shows up

People working in franchise networks will probably recognise this pattern first. The wider Multi-Site and Franchise grouping and the other sectors page show how it presents elsewhere.

Questions worth considering

  1. When a franchisee has raised a concern in the past, what actually happened next — and is that history consistent with what the network intends its process to communicate?
  2. Is the volume of communication with sites increasing while the substance of what sites are willing to share stays roughly the same?
  3. Does the network’s reporting structure make it easier to hear good news than to hear the early signs of a problem?

Your team is facing similar challenges?

They Were Told What, Not Why — franchise network
The Riddle Ledger, a brand of Zoom Riddle

Subscribe to The Riddle Ledger

Perspectives are sent as they are published, with no promotional email, and you can unsubscribe at any time.

Sources

Michael Beer and Russell A. Eisenstat, “The Silent Killers of Strategy Implementation and Learning,” Sloan Management Review (now MIT Sloan Management Review), 41(4), 2000, pp. 29–40.

Amy C. Edmondson, “Psychological Safety and Learning Behavior in Work Teams,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(2), 1999, pp. 350–383.

Donald Sull, Rebecca Homkes and Charles Sull, “Why Strategy Execution Unravels — and What to Do About It,” Harvard Business Review, Vol. 93, No. 3 (March 2015), pp. 57–66.

You need a PDF version for a meeting?

Frequently Asked Questions

Not necessarily. The evidence points more often to what happens after information is shared than to the channel itself — if raising a concern has previously led to increased scrutiny, franchisees will adjust what they choose to report, regardless of how good the channel is.
More frequent contact through a channel that is not trusted tends to produce more opportunities to give a safe answer, not more honest information. The trust gap, not the contact frequency, is usually the underlying constraint.
Cross-unit communication breakdowns happen in any organisation with distributed units. Franchising adds a distinct layer because the franchisee-franchisor relationship is contractual and economic, which changes what a franchisee has at stake in disclosing a difficult issue compared with an employed site manager.
Across more than 250 companies and several thousand managers, only 9% said they could rely on colleagues in other functions and units all of the time to deliver what was expected, and roughly half said most of the time. The researchers concluded that alignment on strategic direction was generally sound and that the breakdown occurred in coordination between units.
Her field study of 51 manufacturing work teams found that psychological safety predicted learning behaviour, meaning willingness to surface problems, ask questions and report mistakes, even after controlling for team efficacy. The page reads this as suggesting that whether information travels depends less on how capable the people are and more on whether raising a problem feels safe or costly.
It is contractual and economic as well as organisational. A franchisee who reports a problem may be disclosing something that affects how their performance is judged, how closely their site is scrutinised or even their standing under the agreement, so the honest report and the safe report are not necessarily the same one.
There is little downside to reporting that a site is doing well, whereas information that reflects poorly on a site or might invite scrutiny travels far less reliably. A network relying mainly on top-line reporting is therefore more likely to hear what is going well than what is not, according to the page.
Yes, the page describes this as a related failure mode. A regional manager relaying a concern is not a neutral conduit and has their own incentives around how a region is perceived, so a concern touching their oversight may be softened, reframed or delayed even though every link is doing something individually reasonable.